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Why FIRREA and Civil Enforcement Cannot Replace 
Individual Criminal Liability 
Timothy Ly

 
I was in a meeting with one of [my bosses], and a few other 
traders, and they were talking about the new hedge-fund 
regulations. Most everyone on Wall Street thought they were a 
bad idea. “But isn’t it better for the system as a whole?” I 
asked. The room went quiet, and my boss shot me a withering 
look. I remember his saying, “I don’t have the brain capacity 
to think about the system as a whole. All I’m concerned with is 
how this affects our company.” . . . From that moment on, I 
started to see Wall Street with new eyes.
1
 
—Sam Polk, former Wall Street trader 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the Savings and Loan Crisis, prosecutors convicted 
over eight hundred corporate executives for criminal fraud.
2 
In the 
 
 
 J.D. (2016), Washington University School of Law. I want to thank Professor Osgood 
for guiding me towards this topic and for granting me permission to use my essay from his 
criminal law class as a starting point for writing this Note; Becca for delivering the final draft of 
this Note to the Journal of Law & Policy office while I was away from St. Louis, and more 
importantly, for her steadfast friendship and counsel; and my parents, who have encouraged and 
supported me throughout law school. Finally, I want to thank Lauren for her patience, her 
kindness, and her love; I couldn’t have asked for a better partner.  
 1. Sam Polk, Op-Ed., For the Love of Money, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/for-the-love-of-money.html. 
 2. William Black, Banking System Rotten to the Core, FINANCIAL SENSE (Nov. 11, 
2011), http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/william-black/2011/11/25/banking-system-
rotten-to-the-core. See also Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle 
and the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2011/04/14/business/20110414-prosecute.html (“By 1992, there had been 1,100 criminal 
prosecutions of individuals involved in ‘major’ S.&L. fraud [resulting in] 839 convictions of 
these individuals.”). 
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aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis
3—a calamity seventy times 
more devastating—the federal government has yet to jail even a 
single executive (save for a solitary bit player).
4
 This lack of criminal 
convictions is unusual especially given the way the government has 
addressed previous financial crises.
5
 To compensate, the federal 
 
 3. For the sake of brevity, this Note concentrates on individual criminal liability and does 
not delve into corporate entity criminal liability. 
 4. Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial 
Crisis Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 168 (2015) (“To date, there have been no 
prosecutions of any Wall Street CEOs, board members, or others at the ‘executive suite’ level. 
And there have been no successful prosecutions of truly senior-level executives either.”); David 
Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1438 (“There has not been a 
single conviction of a bailed-out bank, or a single senior executive who ran one.”). In 2009, 
federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York lost a pair of prosecutions against two 
fund managers of Bear Stearns. Zachary Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders 
Are Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/ 
11bear.html. Several years later, Angelo Mozilo, the CEO of Countrywide Mortgage who 
oversaw the origination of hundreds of billions-of-dollars worth of subprime mortgages, was 
investigated but criminal charges were never brought. See Scott E. Reckard, U.S. Drops 
Criminal Probe of Former Countrywide Chief Angelo Mozilo, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/18/business/la-fi-mozilo-20110219. Finally, in November 
2013, a full five years after the financial crisis, a former investment banker for Credit Suisse, 
was convicted. Rachel Abrams & Peter Lattman, Ex-Credit Suisse Executive Sentenced in 
Mortgage Bond Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/11/22/ex-credit-suisse-executive-sentenced-in-mortgage-case/; Jesse Eisinger, Why Only 
One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html?_ 
r=0. See also Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-punishment.html?hp&_r=0. 
 5. The Savings and Loan Crisis is one useful comparison point, but it is important to note 
that the pattern of public investigations and criminal prosecutions following a financial crisis 
stretches back to the Pujo Committee of 1912–1913 that followed the 1907 Financial Panic. 
Brooklynbadboy, The Pujo Committee and Today’s Banker’s Senate Committee, DAILY KOS 
(June 17, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/17/1100630/-The-Pujo-
Committee-and-today-s-Banker-s-Senate-Committee#. See also Pujo Committee “Money 
Trust” Wall Street Banking Cartel Investigation 1912–1913, PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 5, 
2011), https://publicintelligence.net/pujo-committee-money-trust-wall-street-banking-cartel-
investigation-1912-1913/; PUJO, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED PURUANT TO HOUSE 
RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 TO INVESTIGATE THE CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY 
AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593 (1913), available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 
title/?id=1329. The pattern continued with the 1932–34 Pecora Commission after the Wall 
Street Crash of 1929, the “Keating Five” Congressional hearing and prosecutions following the 
Savings and Loan Crisis, the prosecution of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky following the 
1980s “junk bond” bubble that triggered the Crash of 1987, and the prosecution of Jeff Skilling 
and Kenneth Lay (among many others) after the “dot-com” bubble in 2000. See, e.g., Alan 
Brinkley, When Washington Took on Wall Street, VANITY FAIR (June 2010), http://www.vanity 
fair.com/business/features/2010/06/pecora-201006; S. REP. NO. 73-1455 (1934), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/73235213/Pecora-Commission-Report-Stock-Exchange-Practices-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/16
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government has instead resorted to slapping financial institutions 
with civil fines.
6
 
Despite the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) success in extracting 
record-breaking penalties,
7
 questions still linger about whether these 
civil penalties are enough to make up for the lack of jailed 
executives.
8
 These questions arise largely from the fact that fines 
have not been effective in carrying out the roles traditionally played 
by the criminal system. That is, civil fines have not successfully 
deterred risky bets and illegal behavior,
9
 punished past wrongful and 
 
Report-1934; Keating Five, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
subjects/k/keating_five/index.html, Charles H. Keating Jr., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes. 
com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/charles_h_keating_jr/index.html; Robert McFadden, 
Charles Keating, 90, Key Figure in ‘80s Savings and Loan Crisis, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/business/charles-keating-key-figure-in-the-1980s-
savings-and-loan-crisis-dies-at-90.html; Preliminary Inquiry Into Allegations Regarding 
Senators Cranston, DeConcini, Glenn, McCain, and Riegle, and Lincoln Savings and Loan: 
Open Session Hearings Before the Select Committee on Ethics, 101st Cong. (1990–1991), 
available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011337544; The Turbulence in the Financial 
Markets Last October, the Functioning of our Financial Markets During that Period, and 
Proposals for Structural and Regulatory Reforms: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. (1988), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ 
pt?id=pur1.32754073963526;view=1up;seq=1; Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Enron Fraud Trial 
Ends in 5 Convictions, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at E01; The Financial Collapse of Enron: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.R. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 6. See David Kerem, Change We Can Believe In: Comparative Perspectives on the 
Criminalization of Corporate Negligence, 14 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 95, 107 (2012); 
Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, From Anonymity to Scourge of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2013, at A1; see also Tynan DeBold & Elaine He, The Tab for the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/documents/legaltab/ (“The six largest U.S. 
bank-holding companies have paid about $130 billion in settlements, fines and other costs 
related to the mortgages and the financial crisis.”). 
 7. Jason M. Breslow, How Bank of America’s $16.65 Billion Settlement Compares, 
FRONTLINE (Aug. 21, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-
economy-financial-crisis/untouchables/how-bank-of-americas-16-65-billion-settlement-compares/.  
 8. See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, Why Prosecutors Whiffed on Subprime Crime, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Mar. 14, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-14/why-
prosecutors-whiffed-on-subprime-crime (“One of the great ‘mysteries’ of the post-financial-
crisis era is why there has been almost no prosecution of obvious criminality, particularly in the 
mortgage business.”); Jed. S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level 
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/; Ron Chernow, 
Op-Ed., Where Is Our Ferdinand Pecora?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/01/06/opinion/06chernow.html?pagewanted=all. 
 9. See infra notes 98–101. 
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fraudulent conduct,
10
 or adequately expressed the American public’s 
condemnation of bankers’ reckless misbehavior11—misbehavior that 
resulted in 5 million foreclosed homes,
12
 8.7 million lost jobs,
13
 and 
the destruction of $12.8 trillion in gross domestic product (GDP).
14 
 
While it would normally be unfair to measure the civil system 
against the standards of the criminal system, the government’s use of 
civil penalties makes it clear that the civil system was being 
employed to accomplish what the criminal system had failed to do.
15
 
Given the lengths that prosecutors and judges
16
 have gone to stretch 
the civil system as a substitute for the lack of criminal convictions, it 
seems appropriate to ask what held prosecutors back from using the 
criminal justice system to jail executives in the first place. While 
there are a wide range of contributing causes—the sheer size of 
financial institutions,
17
 the labyrinthine complexity of the financial 
 
 10. See infra notes 103–09. 
 11. See infra notes 92–96.  
 12. CORELOGIC NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT 2 (2014). 
 13. Jim Puzzanghera, Economy Has Recovered 8.7 Million Jobs Lost in Great Recession, 
L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-jobs-20140607-
story.html. 
 14. DENNIS KELLEHER, STEPHEN HALL & KATELYNN BRADLEY, THE COST OF THE WALL 
STREET-CAUSED FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND ONGOING ECONOMIC CRISIS 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/bettermarkets.pdf. Note 
that other reports peg the loss anywhere from $6 trillion up to $14 trillion. See Eduardo Porter, 
Recession’s True Cost is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2014, at B1. 
 15. Kerem, supra note 6, at 107 (“It is the very existence of a bifurcated enforcement 
system in the United States which, in attempting to compensate for the inadequacies of 
American corporate criminal statutes, exacerbates the inequities associated with entity-level 
enforcement.”). See generally Lattman & Protess, supra note 6 (explaining that because banks 
cannot land in jail, civil penalties are often “the strongest tool at the government’s disposal”); 
Andrew Grossman, Emily Glazer, & Christina Rexrode, Fine Mess: The Memo that Cost Banks 
$37 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2014, at A1 (noting that Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act presented a “powerful alternative to criminal prosecutions[.]”). 
 16. See infra notes 62–72. 
 17. Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investigations and 
the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 241 (2009) (“The 
potential amount of fraud in the mortgage industry, coupled with the complexity of fraud 
investigations and federal resource constraints, makes systematic prosecution difficult.”). Sheer 
size is also important in relation to the limited staffing of the FBI and DOJ on these labor 
intensive cases. See Don Mayer, Anita Cava & Catharyn Baird, Crime and Punishment (or the 
Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and 
Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 568 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/16
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fraud (and the accompanying complex investigations),
18
 the 
government’s fear of breaking a still-fragile global economy19—this 
Note focuses primarily on the high burden of proving specific 
criminal intent
20
 and asks whether lowering the required level of 
criminal intent might make prosecutions of financial executives more 
viable,
21
 while still properly protecting individual due process rights. 
Part I of this Note lays out how the DOJ has handled the crisis 
over the last seven years by focusing on one civil tool,
22
 the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), to 
illustrate how the civil system as a whole has been stretched to 
 
 18. Ceresney, Eng & Nuttall, supra note 17, at 235–36, 246 (noting the lack of “objective 
pricing indicators for many of these [financial] instruments, and accounting rules [that] allow 
for significant flexibility and discretion in their valuation”); Kai Ryssdal, Michael Lewis: Wall 
Street Is “Lost”, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 28, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2014/ 
10/28/business/michael-lewis-wall-street-lost. In comparing his time at the bonds trading desk 
at Salomon Brothers in 1980s to Wall Street of present day, author and financial journalist 
Michael Lewis stated, “[Wall Street has] gotten so much more complicated. All of a sudden, 
you’re looking at a truly opaque black box when you’re looking at something that used to be as 
simple as the stock market.” Id.  
 19. See Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Address Before the New York City Bar 
Association on the Role of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in White Collar Criminal Law 
Enforcement (Sept. 12, 2012) (speech notes available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ 
speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html and video available at https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1gbcB5BRzXo); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind 
Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at B1 (expressing his concern before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Attorney General Holder stated, “the size of some of 
these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when 
we are hit with indications that if we do prosecute—if we do bring a criminal charge—it will 
have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy”); Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Pulling Back the Curtain on Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at B1 (noting 
that the lack of criminal prosecutions may also be influenced by the demise of Arthur Andersen 
after it was criminally charged for its role in the Enron scandal). 
 20. See Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for 
Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 105 (2012) (“Unlike civil securities claims 
that can be established by showing recklessness or, under some provisions, just negligence, 
proof of intent to defraud can be quite daunting.”); Ceresney, Eng & Nuttall, supra note 17, at 
241, 246 (“Absent the existence of explicit directives that promoted fraud . . . it may be difficult 
to show that any criminal act [was] taken at executives’ behest or with their knowledge.”). 
 21. Peter J. Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 47 
(2014) (“If a primary reason for the lack of prosecutions of executives is the high threshold for 
proving intent, then one potential response . . . may be to reduce the requisite intent element, so 
that it is easier to pursue a case and establish a violation when there are substantial losses from 
corporate decisions.”). 
 22. This section also touches upon other civil tools such as deferred prosecution 
agreements and the Federal Claims Act to provide a complete picture of the civil system. 
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become a substitute for the criminal system.
23
 Part II analyzes how 
FIRREA fails to effectively condemn, deter, and punish the way 
individual criminal prosecutions can. In light of these deficiencies, 
Part III lays out the case for a financial mismanagement law that 
lowers intent from specific intent to recklessness, and then raises and 
addresses the critiques of such an approach.
24
 Part IV concludes the 
Note with a statement on how the financial mismanagement law fits 
within the regulatory ecosystem. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Advantages of FIRREA (12 U.S.C.A. § 1833a) 
After the 2008 Financial Crisis, federal prosecutors could not 
mount a single successful criminal case against any of the major 
banks or their executives.
25
 With few options at the ready, the DOJ 
began scouring the country for ways to punish banks and other 
financial actors.
26
 In Los Angeles, the DOJ discovered a federal 
prosecutor who had been using 12 U.S.C. § 1833a, a tiny provision 
buried within FIRREA,
27
 to prosecute smalltime mortgage fraud.
28
 As 
 
 23. In recent remarks by several top DOJ officials, the DOJ has suggested that it has not 
lost sight of the need for criminal prosecutions of corporate individuals. See, e.g., Eric Holder, 
Att’y Gen., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU Law School (Sept. 17, 2014) 
(transcript available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/iso/opa/stopfraud/ag-speech-140917.html) 
(“[W]hen it comes to financial fraud, the department recognizes the inherent value of bringing 
enforcement actions against individuals, as opposed to simply the companies that employ them 
. . . We ought to . . . modify our laws where appropriate. It would be going too far to suggest 
reversing the presumption of innocence for any executive, even one atop the most poorly-run 
institution. But we need not tolerate a system that permits top executives to enjoy all of the 
rewards of excessively-risky activity while bearing none of the responsibility.”). 
 24. While this idea has met with strong resistance from academics, lawmakers, and 
practitioners on this side of the Atlantic, their counterparts in Great Britain have embraced it. 
See generally Holder, supra note 23 (explaining Britain’s recent financial reform law that 
requires companies to make one officer personally responsible for any misconduct). 
 25. See Lattman & Protess, supra note 6. 
 26. See generally id. 
 27. For further information on the history of FIRREA and its role in cleaning up the 
Savings and Loan Crisis, see FREDERIC MISHKIN, ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS ch. 12 app. 1 (10th ed. 2012) available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/ 
objects/13761/14091673/appendixes/ch11apx1.pdf. See also Robert J. Laughlin, Causes of the 
Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S301 (1991).  
 28. Lattman & Protess, supra note 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/16
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the DOJ learned more, it realized that FIRREA had the potential to be 
a powerful weapon against large financial institutions.
29
 
By way of introduction, FIRREA broadens the scope of a 
prosecutor’s powers.30 Under the False Claims Act,31 another 
common tool for prosecuting financial fraud, prosecution is generally 
restricted to instances where “the United States suffers a pecuniary 
loss as a result of fraud.”32 FIRREA expands upon this power by 
allowing for the prosecution of persons or entities who perpetrate 
financial fraud affecting a “federally insured financial institution.”33 
Second, the burden of proof for FIRREA’s predicate offenses is 
lower than in criminal prosecution.
34
 To trigger FIRREA, a defendant 
must commit one of fourteen predicate offenses.
35
 While a criminal 
case requires prosecutors to prove the commission of any of these 
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) states that 
penalties may be levied where the underlying crime has been 
established by a preponderance of the evidence.
36
 
Third, FIRREA allows prosecutors to access valuable information 
through administrative subpoenas—without the need for judicial 
 
 29. Id. (“[Tony] West [then head of the DOJ Civil Division] circulated a three-page memo 
to every United States attorney in the country, urging broader use of Firrea. Citing the ‘potential 
deterrent effect,’ Mr. West outlined the Justice Department’s ‘guidelines for approval’ of cases 
under Firrea.”). 
 30. Antonia Dias et al., FIRREA Civil Money Penalties: The Government’s Newfound 
Weapon Against Financial Fraud, JONES DAY (May 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/firrea-
civil-money-penalties-the-governments-newfound-weapon-against-financial-fraud/. 
 31. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).  
 32. Dias et al., supra note 30.  
 33. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1833(c)(2) (2012).  
 34. Dias et al., supra note 30; 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f).  
 35. Dan Webb & Robb C. Adkins, DOJ Using Old Law in New—and Worrisome—Way, 
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 2, 2013), http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/7/4/v2/74767/005121302 
Winston.pdf. These predicate offenses fall generally under several categories: bribery and graft; 
various forms of theft and embezzlement; and fraud and false statements, including mail and 
wire fraud. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). 
 36. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (“Burden of proof. In a civil action to recover a civil penalty 
under this section, the Attorney General must establish the right to recovery by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”); see John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Bank Fraud Prosecution Act of 1990: 
Has Congress Gone Too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 246 (1993) (“The provisions allowing 
civil penalties for criminal offenses are unfair because they allow prosecution to circumvent the 
criminal standard of proof for these offenses . . . [T]he Attorney General need only prove guilt 
by a preponderance of the evidence, although the action is based on criminal activities, which 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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approval or having to contend with motions to dismiss.
37
 Under 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a(g), the DOJ can “tak[e] depositions of key witnesses 
and compel . . . the production of documents and records, without 
obtaining prior judicial authorization,”38 so long as it is done “in 
contemplation of a civil proceeding under [FIRREA].”39 The 
defendant in such a case has no reciprocal power.
40
 
Fourth, information gathered from a civil investigation can be 
provided to a parallel criminal investigation.
41
 Perhaps more 
importantly, criminal prosecutors working on a parallel criminal 
investigation may provide civil prosecutors access to grand jury 
material without a court order.
42
 This flow of information allows a 
civil suit to capitalize on evidence developed in a criminal 
investigation, even if the criminal investigation does not go forth.
43
  
Fifth, for mail or wire fraud (two of the fourteen predicate crimes 
listed in 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)) that affects a financial institution, the 
statute of limitations is ten years.
44
 This limitations period is longer 
than standard civil suits, and longer than mail or wire fraud that does 
not affect a financial statute.
45
  
 
 37. Andrew W. Schilling, U.S. Using Subpoenas Under 1989 Act as New Tool to Probe 
Financial Firms, REUTERS BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-
forum/2013/01/03/u-s-using-subpoenas-under-1989-act-as-new-tool-to-probe-financial-firms/. 
 38. Dias et al., supra note 30. 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(g)(1). 
 40. See Jay Williams, Valrie Hays & Mir Ali, FIRREA: An Old Acronym Is Turning Into 
the Government’s New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING L.J. 
579, 581–82 (2012). 
 41. Supra note 37. Moreover, the United States Attorneys’ Manual strongly encourages 
parallel investigations and communication between criminal and civil investigations. See 
Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to All United States Attorneys, Director, FBI, All 
Assistant United States Attorneys, All Litigating Divisions & All Trial Attorneys (Jan. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/doj 
00027.htm (“Department policy is that criminal prosecutors and civil trial counsel should 
timely communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with one another and agency attorneys to the 
fullest extent appropriate. . . .”). 
 42. Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud ‘Affect’ a 
Financial Institution?, 99 BBR 186 (2012), available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/ 
uploads/36/ doc/understanding-firreas-reach.pdf (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3322(a)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Patricia Hurtado, Lots of Ways to Extend Statute of Limitations, Bharara Says, 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 17, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-07- 
17/bharara-says-u-dot-s-dot-has-more-time-to-bring-insider-trading-cases; 12 U.S.C. 1833(h) 
(2006). 
 45. Dias et al., supra note 30; William M. Sloan, Mail and Wire Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/16
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And finally, although FIRREA does not allow for imprisonment, 
its financial penalties are hefty. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b), a 
violator can be fined up to $1.1 million per violation, or up to $5.5 
million per continuing violation.
46 This amount can be increased “up 
to the amount of the pecuniary gain that any person derives from the 
violation, or the amount of pecuniary loss suffered by any person as a 
result of the violation.”47 
Together, these advantages
48
 give federal prosecutors the power to 
essentially build a criminal case without the hassle of proving their 
case beyond a reasonable doubt.
49
 If FIRREA could pass muster in 
the courts, it would allow federal prosecutors to levy stiff penalties. 
The only thing left for the DOJ to do was test the waters. 
B. Interpreting FIRREA 
Up until 2009, there had been little FIRREA case law to define the 
boundaries of the statute.
50
 One of the most important questions 
courts had to address was how to interpret FIRREA’s requirement 
that a wire or mail fraud “affect . . . a federally insured financial 
institution.”51 United States v. The Bank of New York Mellon52 was 
the first case to answer that question.
53
 In doing so, it would set the 
 
REV. 905, 925 (2011). 
 46. Dias et al., supra note 30. Although 12 U.S.C. § 1833a lists penalties of $1 million 
and $5 million, in 1999, the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 
increased the amounts to $1.1 million and $5.5 million. See Adjustments to Penalties, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 85.3(a)(6), (7) (2014). 
 47. Dias et al., supra note 30; 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3)(A). 
 48. One final powerful feature of FIRREA is its whistleblower bounty (12 U.S.C. 
§ 4205(d)(1)(a)(i) (2012)). While not as generous as the False Claims Act’s whistleblower 
bounty (31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2) (2012)), it has proven itself useful in the case against 
Bank of America. See Andrew W. Schiller, Should FIRREA Whistleblower Bounties Be 
Higher?, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/581235/should-firrea-
whistleblower-bounties-be-higher; Nate Raymond, Bank of America Fraud Trial Spotlights 
Whistleblower Awards, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bankofamerica-hustle-whistleblower-idUSBRE98Q18420130927.  
 49. Supra notes 34–36. 
 50. Webb & Adkins, supra note 35. 
 51. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2006). 
 52. 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 53. Id. at 443 (“[T]his decision marks the first occasion upon which a court has been 
called to interpret the meaning of the phrase ‘affecting a federally insured financial institution’ 
under that section.”). 
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stage for applying FIRREA to future prosecutions of banks involved 
in the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
1. United States v. The Bank of New York Mellon 
In Bank of New York Mellon, the Bank of New York Mellon 
(BNYM) fraudulently misrepresented the way it priced foreign 
currency exchanges.
54
 Its advertising to clients stated that BNYM 
would exchange foreign currencies at the “best execution 
standards.”55 General banking practices interpreted this phrase to 
mean “at the best available market price.”56 In practice, however, 
BNYM would trade currency at the highest possible price for clients, 
re-trade at a lower price, and then pocket the difference.
57
 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 
(USAO) brought suit using FIRREA.
58
 In order to apply FIRREA to 
financial institutions, however, the USAO had to overcome one 
major hurdle: the interpretation of the word “affecting.”59 In its 
motion to dismiss, BNYM contended that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the word “affecting” was “victimize” because it 
reflected Congress’ purpose when it created FIRREA—to protect 
banks from being defrauded.
60
 BNYM went on to argue that under 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a, a fraud had to be perpetrated, not by any person 
internal to a financial institution, but by outside actors who directed 
their fraud at a financial institution.
61 
BNYM also questioned the 
logic of USAO’s claim. It argued that to accept a definition of 
FIRREA that encompassed the broader meaning of “indirectly harm,” 
 
 54. Matt Levine, Wait, Sorry, Bank of New York Thought You Wanted To Buy High and 
Sell Low, Was That Wrong?, DEALBREAKER (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:18 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/ 
2011/10/wait-sorry-bank-of-new-york-thought-you-wanted-to-buy-high-and-sell-low-was-that-
wrong/; Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 445–46, 449–50. 
 55. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 445–46. 
 56. Id. at 445. 
 57. Levine, supra note 54; Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48. This model 
was highly profitable. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (“The [second amended 
complaint] alleges that BNYM’s sales margins for its top 200 standing instructions clients 
totaled over $1.5 billion from 2007 to 2010.”). 
 58. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 59. Id. at 451–57. 
 60. Id. at 454. 
 61. Id. at 451. 
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as the USAO suggested, would be to say that BNYM was both the 
perpetrator and the victim of its own fraud.
62
  
Judge Lewis Kaplan rejected BNYM’s narrow definition. Instead, 
he held that “affecting” could be read more broadly to mean 
something akin to “involving.”63 He reasoned that several features of 
the statute and legislative history suggested this broader approach. 
First, Judge Kaplan pointed to the dictionary definitions for 
“affecting”: “to produce a material influence upon . . . to have a 
detrimental influence on.”64 Nowhere could he find, nor could he 
infer, that “victimize” was within or necessary to the definition.65 
Second, within the entire statutory schema—that is, beyond the 
sections circumscribed by BNYM (12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1)-(3))—the 
frauds affecting financial institutions were listed alongside other 
predicate offenses that “do not require that any financial institution be 
victimized.”66 Such a listing suggested that Congress was not 
concerned solely with victimization, but also “with the presence of 
criminal activity in matters meaningfully involving financial 
institutions, however that activity may affect them.”67 Third, even 
accepting BNYM’s contention that “affecting” meant “victimized,” 
Judge Kaplan read the legislative history as showing that S&L 
depositors and federal taxpayers—not banks—were the underlying 
victims Congress sought to protect.
68
 Finally, Judge Kaplan rejected 
the notion that the fraud had to be perpetrated by a third party.
69 “[I]t 
would be entirely unnatural to make determination of whether a bank 
was ‘affected’ by a scheme turn on whether it participated in it.”70 
 
 62. Marvin G. Pickholz & Mary C. Pennisi, Recent Federal Court Decisions Revitalize 
The Government’s Civil Enforcement Power Under FIRREA, FIN. FRAUD L. REP., July–Aug. 
2013, at 599. 
 63. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 64. Id. at 451 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1993)). 
 65. Id. Judge Kaplan relied partially on a line of Second Circuit decisions starting with 
United States v Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 1998). These cases reject the idea that “a 
financial institution participating in a fraudulent scheme could not be ‘affected’ because it was 
not the victim of the scheme.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
 66. Id. at 453.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 455. 
 69. Id. (“Congress was addressing not only frauds by insiders who were trying to harm 
their employers, but also frauds by insiders seeking to benefit their employers.”) 
 70. Id.; see also id. at 461 (“It is perfectly natural to say that one’s actions may affect 
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In applying this interpretation of “affected” to the facts in 
SDNY’s complaint, Judge Kaplan concluded that BNYM had been 
affected negatively: BNYM lost clients, increased its legal liability, 
and suffered damage to its reputation.
71 
Moreover, such damage could 
not be offset by the fact BNYM profited from its own scheme.
72 
BNYM’s motion to dismiss the FIRREA charges was denied.73  
2. U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bank of America Corp et al and U.S. 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
With the success of applying FIRREA to large financial 
institutions in general, the DOJ needed to test the statute specifically 
on banks that had been involved in the 2008 Financial Crisis. The 
USAO did just that in U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bank of America 
Corp et al.
74
 Under the auspices of Judge Jed Rakoff, the District 
Court addressed the question of whether the broad interpretation of 
FIRREA—dubbed the “self-affecting” theory—would apply to a 
division of Bank of America that had fraudulently misrepresented the 
quality of bundled mortgage loans.
75
 Because neither of its intended 
victims—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—were federally insured, the 
federal prosecutors could only apply FIRREA if they could claim 
Bank of America affected itself while perpetrating its own fraud.
76
  
Bank of America filed a motion to dismiss the FIRREA claim, 
repeating many of the same arguments that the defendants made in 
 
oneself. For example, one might say ‘John’s criminal behavior is affecting his future career 
prospects’ and ‘John’s criminal behavior [thus] is affecting him.’”). 
 71. Id. at 458–59. 
 72. Id. at 459. 
 73. Id. at 443, 463. 
 74. This case was formerly United States v. Countrywide Financial Corp., until the 
Government joined the Edward O’Donnell whistleblower suit against Bank of America. United 
States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 33 F.Supp.3d 494, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
 75. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Co., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 76. Id.; see Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 13-17, United States ex rel. 
O’Donnell v. Bank Of America Corp., 83 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 12-cv-1422 
(JSR)), 2012 WL 7655487 (“[B]ecause the allegedly ‘defrauded’ GSE’s [i.e., Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac] are not federally insured financial institutions protected by § 1833a, the 
Complaint advances a tortured theory of injury to other institutions that invested with the 
GSEs.”). 
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BNYM.
77
 While Judge Rakoff stated in the hearing that he was 
“troubled” by the self-affected theory,78 he eventually allowed the 
FIRREA claim to survive the motion to dismiss (and a subsequent 
summary judgment) based on a very quick plain language reading of 
the statute.
79
 Several months later, a jury convicted Bank of America 
of the FIRREA charges.
80
 
Within months of both Bank of America and BNYM, Judge Jesse 
Furman allowed a FIRREA suit to go to trial in U.S. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A.
81
 
3. Settlements and Final Judgments 
All three cases have yielded settlements in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars (or in the case of Bank of America, a trial 
judgment of more than $1 billion).
82
 FIRREA has also resulted in 
large settlements elsewhere. In JP Morgan’s $13 billion settlement 
with the DOJ, $2 billion of that was calculated based on violations of 
FIRREA.
83 
Similarly, Deutsche Bank and Citimortgage have settled 
 
 77. Id. at 13–17 (arguing that Congress intended that any fraud in § 1833a(c)(2) “be 
limited to crimes against or directly concerning federally insured financial institutions” and that 
FIRREA was designed to protect financial institutions). 
 78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, 22, O’Donnell, F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(No. 12-cv-1422 (JSR)). 
 79. See Countrywide Fin. Co., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (rejecting the defendant’s entire 
arguments in just two short paragraphs based on a Webster’s Dictionary definition of “affect”). 
 80. Nate Raymond, Bank of America Liable for Countrywide Mortgage Fraud, REUTERS 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 6:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-bankofamerica-hustle-
idUSBRE99M14B20131023. 
 81. See generally United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (reasoning again that the self-affecting theory is supported by both legislative history and 
a plain language analysis). 
 82. United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 
494, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (requiring Bank of America to pay $1.27 billion). Wells Fargo settled 
its case to the tune of $1.2 billion, but the details have not yet been worked out. Order of 
Dismissal at 1, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 12-cv-7527 (JMF)) 
available at http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/download.html?id=231632508&z=2bd1fc3f. 
BNYM settled its case for $714 million, of which $167.5 million was calculated based on 
violations of FIRREA. BNYM Settlement at 8, available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/ 
usao/nys/pressreleases/March15/BNYMSettlement2/US%20v%20%20BNYM%20et%20al%20
stip%20&%20settlement.pdf. 
 83. JPMorgan Settlement Agreement at 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
resources/69520131119191246941958.pdf.  
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FIRREA claims for $202 million and $158 million, respectively.
84 
In 
2015, Standard & Poor’s settled its longstanding suit with the DOJ 
for $1.375 billion,
85
 after having been threatened with a $5 billion 
suit based on FIRREA.
86
 Taken together, these cases have solidified 
FIRREA’s place as the tool of choice for federal prosecutors. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. How Does FIRREA Compare to Past Attempts at “Creative” 
White-Collar Prosecution? 
The USAO’s novel application of an old statute is part of a 
longstanding tradition of “creative” prosecution. During the 1980s, 
then U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani used the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a statute aimed primarily at 
mob bosses, to take down financial kingpins like Michael Milken and 
Ivan Boesky.
87
 In the 1990s to early 2000s, New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer revived the Martin Act to fight major financial 
institutions, including Merrill Lynch and American Insurance Group 
(AIG).
88
 
What sets FIRREA apart from both RICO and the Martin Act, 
however, is its function as a quasi-proxy for criminal prosecution.
89
 
Where RICO and the Martin Act gave prosecutors the ability to 
pursue criminal and civil prosecutions, FIRREA’s power is limited 
 
 84. Peter Lattman, U.S. Sues Wells Fargo, Accusing It of Lying About Mortgages, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/u-s-sues-wells-fargo-
alleging-mortgage-deceit/.  
 85. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department and State 
Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to 
the Financial Crisis (Feb. 3, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-defrauding-investors. 
 86. Aruna Viswanatha & Lauren Taca Lacapra, U.S. Government Slams S&P with $5 
Billion Fraud Lawsuit, REUTERS (Feb.5, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/02/05/us-mcgrawhill-sandp-civilcharges-idUSBRE9130U120130205. 
 87. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 450, 471 (1991). Guiliani’s use of RICO was 
not without criticism. See G. Robert Blakey, Foreword: Debunking Rico’s Myriad Myths, 64 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 701, 724 n.125 (1990). 
 88. Michael J. De La Merced, In JPMorgan Case, the Martin Act Rides Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/in-jpmorgan-case-
the-martin-act-rides-again/. 
 89. See supra notes 15, 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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purely to civil suits predicated on a criminal offense.
90
 In that sense, 
FIRREA acts not as a supplement to criminal prosecution, but instead 
as an effort to use civil prosecution to compensate for the DOJ’s 
failure in criminal prosecutions. The combination of a predicate 
criminal offense, subpoena power, weighty penalties, and the ability 
to share material in parallel investigations creates a free pass for the 
federal government to build a criminal case without meeting the 
criminal standard for burden of proof.
91
 
B. Is FIRREA, by Itself or in Conjunction with Other Civil Statutes, a 
Viable Substitute to Criminal Prosecutions? 
Given its use as a replacement for the lack of criminal 
prosecutions, FIRREA must measure up to what an effective criminal 
prosecution could offer. And on all three fronts—condemnation, 
deterrence, and punishment—it fails. 
FIRREA fails first in its lack of condemnation for those who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the financial crisis.
92
 Being labeled a 
convict or a felon is powerful because it expresses society’s moral 
disapproval for particularly abhorrent action and, in doing so, marks 
the condemned for all to see.
93
 Civil penalties, on the other hand, do 
not attach the same moral disapprobation.
94
 Instead, they do little 
more than suggest a minor infraction of rules designed to keep 
 
 90. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012) (labeled “Civil Penalties”). 
 91. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for 
Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 116 (2012). Not all academics subscribe to 
this divide or accept the idea that only criminal punishment is stigmatizing. See, e.g., Abraham 
S. Goldstein, White-Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101 YALE L.J. 8, 1895, 1899 (1992) 
(“Civil processes and sanctions have emerged that are often more punitive than criminal 
processes but equally stigmatizing.”). 
 93. John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models. And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L. J. 8, 1875, 1876 (1992) (“[A]pplying 
the civil law to behavior that has traditionally been punished criminally might deprive society 
of its ability to focus censure and assign blame with the moral force that the criminal law may 
uniquely possess.”). 
 94. See, e.g., United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. 
Supp. 3d 494, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that because FIRREA is a civil statute, “there is no 
threat of imprisonment nor the stigma associated with a criminal charge”). 
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society functioning and orderly.
95
 In other words, FIRREA’s fines do 
not condemn executives because the fines are analogous to a parking 
ticket—less of a rebuke and more of an inconvenience that can be 
easily paid. Seen in this light, the payment of these fines also affirms 
an unseemly truth of the American justice system: those with power 
and money can, more often than not, buy their way out of punishment 
while the rest of the America cannot.
96
 
Second, despite defense lawyers’ overdramatic gripes about 
onerous financial penalties,
97
 fines do little to reform behavior.
98
 In 
several major bank settlements (not directly related to mortgage 
fraud), large financial institutions have continued to violate the terms 
of the settlement
99
 or misrepresent the extent of their liability.
100
 Even 
 
 95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing how civil law “prices” while 
criminal law “sanctions”).  
 96. From the view of equal justice before the law, there is also an implicit message that 
the criminal system affords wealthy individuals a chance at rehabilitation that the indigent or 
every day person does not have. See Susan Beck, Q&A: Brandon Garrett on Corporate 
Prosecution Agreements, AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.litigationdaily. 
com/id=1202673782472/QA-Brandon-Garrett-on-Corporate-Prosecution-Agreements?slreturn= 
20160803190851 (“In the everyday criminal justice system, there’s a firm focus on holding 
individuals accountable. But when corporations obtain deferred prosecution agreements, only 
one-third of the time do you see people prosecuted, and it’s usually not a CEO or a top 
executive.”); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence 
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. 
REV. 865, 920–21 (2011) (“[Not punishing] the crimes of the rich and powerful sends an 
unmistakable message: despite the obvious and extensive harm they cause to many, elite 
criminals are above the law and will not pay a price to society for disrupting its rules and 
imposing suffering on others.”). 
 97. Jesse Eisinger, In Turnabout, Former Regulators Assail Wall St. Watchdogs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2014, at B9. One prominent defense attorney felt that punishing financial 
institutions has become a “scrum” among federal agencies where “penalties cannot be too 
large” and there is “no consistency [other] than that penalties and sanctions are much more 
draconian.” Id. 
 98. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 93 (noting that aside from punitive damages, the overriding 
character of civil deterrence is to “price,” while the overriding character of criminal deterrence 
is to “sanction”). While FIRREA is considered a punitive civil statute, in this instance, it truly 
operates more as a price than a sanction on financial institutions given the ratio of fines to 
company profits. 
 99. Peter J. Henning, Banks’ Cycle of Misbehavior, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014, 1:13 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/03/banks-cycle-of-misbehavior/?emc=edit_dlbkpm_201 
41103&nl=business&nlid=35739953&_r=0 (noting that banks that had negotiated settlements 
are adding more money to their legal reserves, anticipating more fines for ongoing foreign 
exchange rate manipulation even though such manipulation violates their settlements); see also 
Christie Smythe & David Voreacos, UBS Said to Be Probed for Deferred-Prosecution, Breach, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
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when these fines are coupled with negotiated settlements, such 
settlements often only require that institutions “do better on 
compliance” or “use best practices,” leading some critics to argue 
that these compliance requirements are “largely cosmetic.”101 Part of 
the powerlessness of penalties and settlements may also result from 
the fact that fines of corporations are so diffuse in pinpointing 
responsibility, especially in comparison to criminal prosecutions of 
individuals.
102
 
Finally, despite the eye-popping size of FIRREA penalties, it is 
clear that the fines are hardly punitive.
103
 There are several reasons 
for this. First, in comparison to the profits reaped by most banks, the 
fines only made a small dent in their bottom lines.
104
 Second, any 
possible punitive impact has been blunted further by the fact that 
banks can either write-off large portions of the penalties as tax 
deductions
105
 or, when corporations have liability insurance, shunt the 
 
2015-02-12/ubs-bond-probe-said-to-look-at-whether-bank-breached-tax-deal (“Investigators 
suspect the [illegal] conduct may have occurred when the bank was still bound by the deferred-
prosecution agreement . . . ‘UBS has already settled three prosecution agreements since 2009 
. . . UBS is already a recidivist many times over. . . .’”). 
 100. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Prosecutors Suspect Repeat Offenses on 
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014, at A1 (noting that Standard Chartered and Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ may have failed to disclose the full extent of its involvement in 
transferring money for Iran and other blacklisted countries). 
 101. Rakoff, supra note 8 (“I suggest that the future deterrent value of successfully 
prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance 
measures that are often little more than window-dressing.”). 
 102. See Michael Rothfeld, Firms Are Penalized, but Many Workers Aren’t, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 17, 2014, at C1. 
 103. See generally Lynnley Browning, How Credit Suisse Got Off Easy, NEWSWEEK (June 
19, 2014, 9:32 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/06/27/how-credit-suisse-got-easy-
255453.html (“As serious on paper as a guilty plea is, says Jonathan Macey, a professor of 
corporate, finance and securities law at Yale University, ‘no one is taking these settlements 
seriously anymore.’”). 
 104. Jason M. Breslow, How Bank of America’s $16.65 Billion Settlement Compares, 
FRONTLINE (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-bank-of-americas-
16-65-billion-settlement-compares/. Note that only Bank of America had a total financial 
penalty that has come close to equaling or outsizing its post-financial crisis profits. 
 105. See, e.g., Michael Rapoport, BofA Could See $4 Billion in Tax Savings From $16.65 
Billion Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/bofa-
could-see-4-billion-in-tax-savings-from-16-65-billion-settlement; Michael Rapoport & 
Christina Rexrode, Citigroup to Get Tax Silver Lining in $7 Billion Settlement, WALL ST. J. 
BLOGS, (July 14, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/14/citigroup-to-get-
tax-silver-lining-in-7-billion-settlement/; Michael Rapaport & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan’s 
$5.1 Billion Settlement Is Tax Deductible, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:30 PM), 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 51:279 
 
 
costs off to insurance companies.
106
 Third, the costs are not borne 
directly by the leadership, or even the employees of the firms, but 
instead divided among shareholders who have little to no influence 
on day-to-day operations.
107
 The result is punishment of shareholders 
rather than true offenders.
108
 Finally, the executives of financial 
institutions see these fines as a cost of business.
109
 In their 
calculations, these fines and the associated legal fees likely do not 
outweigh the lucrative benefits of risky misbehavior. 
III. A FINANCIAL RECKLESSNESS LAW 
A. The Proposal 
Given the failure of FIRREA to sufficiently address the needs of 
criminal punishment, what reforms could be made to the criminal 
system?
110
 This section suggests creating a financial misconduct 
law—similar to the one employed by Great Britain—that lowers the 
intent requirement for prosecution from specific intent
111
 to criminal 
 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304200804579166060830937826. See also 
Lynnley Browning, Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-Offs for Banks, NEWSWEEK 
(Oct. 27, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-are-giant-
tax-write-offs-wall-street-279993.html (“Payments flagged as penalties or fines, typically 
outlined in criminal cases, are generally not deductible, as opposed to the civil settlements with 
banks.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 96 (2010). 
 107. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1477, 1495 (1996); Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 
U. COLO. L. 1, 25 (2014) (“[B]ecause the penalty for corporate criminal liability is ultimately 
monetary, shareholders directly bear the cost.”). 
 108. Elizabeth A. Plimpton & Danielle Walsh, Corporate Criminal Liability, 47 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 331, 332 (2010) (“[P]unishing a corporation in effect punishes innocent 
stockholders.”). 
 109. Press Release, Office of United States Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Calls On 
Congress To Close Tax Loophole For Corporate Misconduct (Jan. 13, 2015) (“Under current 
law, a corporation or individual business owner may deduct the cost of court-ordered punitive 
damages as an ‘ordinary’ business expense . . . [t]hat undermines the whole point of punitive 
damages.”). 
 110. This does not address the obvious critique that it would be virtually impossible to 
lower the intent requirement given the criminal defense lobby and financial power of corporate 
executives. 
 111. Supra note 22. 
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recklessness
112
 as an answer to one piece of the regulatory puzzle.
113
 
A financial misconduct law has several advantages. The most 
obvious advantage is that it lowers the hurdle for bringing a 
prosecution.
114
 Second, it works through the criminal system to 
 
 112. According to the Model Penal Code: “A person acts recklessly with respect to a 
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(c) (1981). Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) 
(“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the 
scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the 
Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required.”). See infra note 123 for further 
discussion.  
 113. As prosecutors in America hashed out the liability of banks in the court room, the 
leaders of Parliament in the United Kingdom attempted to remedy the wrongs they saw by 
passing the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013. Memorandum from Cleary 
Gottlieb, UK Enacts Banking Reform Act 2013, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Feb. 18, 2014), available 
at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/e311a0e2-ec4f-4675-b973-1e0d00a70376/Presentation/ 
NewsAttachment/1d136084-0301-4b1b-84bc-1eca500ea814/UK%20Enacts%20Banking%20 
Reform%20Act.pdf; Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act c. 33 (2013), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/33/contents/enacted. Included in the Act was a new 
law criminalizing “reckless mismanagement causing a financial institution to fail.” Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act (2013), supra. The Act was written to target only the top 
executives of financial institutions and only in the most extreme situations of institutional 
failure. Gary Wilson & Sarah Wilson, Criminal Responses and Financial Misconduct in 
Twenty-First Century Britain: Tradition and Points of Departure, and the Significance of the 
Conscious Past, 3 L. CRIME & HIST. 1 (2013), available at http://www.pbs.plymouth.ac.uk/ 
solon/journal/vol.3%20issue3%202013%20pt3/Wilson,%20Conscious%20Past%20%20Nov%2
02013.pdf. The punishment for violating the law included an “unlimited fine and a custodial 
sentence of up to 7 years.” Memorandum from Clearly Gottlieb, supra. The law was originally 
spurred by the 2008 financial crisis, which caused the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
and the United Kingdom’s subsequent bailout/capital injection. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH. BD., 
THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf. See also Henning, supra note 21 for an excellent discussion of 
Germany and Great Britain’s laws regarding individual liability for executives. 
 114. See generally Ann M. Olazabal, The Search for “Middle Ground”: Towards A 
Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s New Pleading 
Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 153, 158–61 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“reserved the issue of whether recklessness would suffice to prove scienter in a securities fraud 
case, hinting only that ‘in certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of 
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act’”) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976)); see also id. at 160 (“Reckless conduct may be 
defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a 
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that 
the actor must have been aware of it.”). 
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condemn and properly brand an irresponsible executive in a way that 
the civil system cannot.
115
 Third, because this law will be within the 
criminal system, it retains the Constitutional protections afforded 
criminal defendants.
116
 Fourth, if the legislation is modeled closely 
upon the British reckless management law, the American law’s reach 
will be limited in two crucial ways: it would apply to high-level 
executives and only when their extreme mismanagement contributes 
directly to system-wide financial collapse.
117
 Finally, a criminal 
recklessness standard correctly balances the punishment of a culpable 
mental state while not punishing actions that lack a mens rea or 
scienter in the way a negligence
118
 or strict liability scheme would.
119
 
B. The Critiques 
The approach is certainly not without criticisms. First, opponents 
fear that the criminal recklessness standard criminalizes behavior that 
is simply not criminal.
120
 They argue that, if anything, the captains of 
industry made poor business decisions during the 2008 Financial 
Crisis based on miscalculated risk.
121
 Second, in a closely related 
argument, if such behavior is not criminal, to punish such action 
 
 115. See supra note 90. 
 116. See Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 908 (2012) 
(“Because administrative penalties are ‘civil’ in nature, they escape the wide range of 
constitutional provisions protecting the rights of criminal defendants.”). 
 117. See supra note 113. 
 118. Kerem, supra note 6, at 109–13 (advocating a simple negligence, or in some cases 
recklessness, standard for punishing corporate misconduct). 
 119. See Colin Maher, Crisis Not Averted: Lack of Criminal Prosecutions Leave Limited 
Consequences for Those Responsible for the Financial Crisis, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 459, 474–75 (2013) (advocating strict liability as a way to promote 
accountability and prosecutions of financial executives). 
 120. E.g., Mark Pomerantz, There Were No Convictions of Bankers for Good Reason, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/27/ holding-
bankers-accountable/there-were-no-convictions-of-bankers-for-good-reason (“The reason that 
senior bankers did not face charges . . . is that the executives running companies like Bank of 
America, Citigroup and JP Morgan were not committing criminal acts. To the extent that there 
was misconduct, there is no evidence that it occurred at the highest levels or that top executives 
knew that mortgages accepted for securitization did not meet underwriting standards.”). What 
the author’s logic misses, however, is that the lack of evidence does not equate to a lack of 
wrongdoing. 
 121. E.g., Ceresney, Eng & Nuttall, supra note 17, at 273 (“Many institutional failures in 
the credit crisis were the result of human errors in judgment—in some cases, massive errors—
but not intentional wrongdoing.”). 
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would be mob justice, making an example of executives merely to 
satisfy populist bloodlust.
122
 Third, others argue that criminal 
recklessness does not make prosecutions more viable because 
criminal recklessness is a slippery term and a controversial concept in 
criminal law.
123
 It will be even more difficult to determine what 
constitutes the normal level of risk that a prudent banking executive 
should exercise when, for example, the volatile derivatives market 
was practically inscrutable,
124
 and then to show that the banking 
executive knew and ignored a known risk. Fourth, the reflexive desire 
to use the criminal system to solve social woes adds to the problem of 
over-criminalization.
125
 Finally, there are clawback provisions and 
industry bars that punish without the problems listed above.
126
 
C. The Retort 
Each of these critiques will be taken in turn. 
First, the idea that nothing reprehensible happened because the big 
banks did not foresee the risk associated with mortgage-backed 
 
 122. See Zaring, supra note 4, at 1418 (“Those calling for more cases must respond to an 
objection about criminal prosecution widely held among corporate legal scholars, who have 
viewed it in the past as an unattractive and random scapegoating of business leaders that caters 
to mob sentiments and often is used to mask the lack of effective regulation that should have 
prevented the risky behavior before the fact.”). 
 123. In regards to a few other financial crimes, such as mail and wire fraud, several circuits 
have recognized recklessness as an appropriate form of mens rea. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bermes, 9 F. App’x 207, 209 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Fraudulent intent is shown if a representation is 
made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity.”) (quoting United States v. Cusino, 694 
F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982)); United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“The government met the mail- and wire-fraud statutes’ intent requirements through proof that 
[the defendant] was reckless in his disregard for the truth of the statements that he made to 
victims to obtain their money.). 
 124. See generally Patricia Hurtado, Bob Van Voris, & Linda Sandler, Bear Managers’ 
Acquittal May Hamper U.S. Fraud Prosecutions, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2009, 12:24 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/app s/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alBcul0c3hPk (“Larry Ribstein, 
a law professor at University of Illinois, said the Bear Stearns case was ‘standard business 
dealings where the views of the markets were shifting rapidly and these guys were being 
criminally punished for expressing views on one day and acting differently another day.’”). 
 125. Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives for 
Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 92, 107–17 (2012) (discussing issues related 
to over-criminalization and advocating full-usage of current civil statutes rather than changes in 
criminal law). 
 126. Id. 
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securities defies both the history of past financial crises
127
 and the 
facts.
128
 Economists, even those hired by the banks themselves,
129
 
foresaw the coming tsunami.
130
 Internal emails have been uncovered 
that show bankers knew, in the words of Senator Carl Levin, that the 
financial products they were hocking were “piece[s] of crap.”131 In a 
 
 127. Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate 
Deterrent for Willful Violations? Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 127 (2010), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CHRG-111shrg63555/pdf/CHRG-111shrg63555.pdf (noting several historical studies on fraud 
during past financial crises and that the 2008 Financial Crisis possesses many of the hallmark 
traits of past crises that showed fraud). 
 128. See Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-mortgage-fraud-
made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html?mabReward=R6&abt=0002&abg=1 (citing an academic 
paper that provides “evidence that the lending industry’s conduct during the housing boom 
often broke the law”) (citing ATIF R. MIAN & AMAR SUFI, FRAUDULENT INCOME 
OVERSTATEMENT ON MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS DURING THE CREDIT EXPANSION OF 2002 TO 
2005 (Feb. 2015), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20947); Scot Paltrow, Special 
Report: The Watchdogs that Didn’t Bark, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-foreclosures-idUSTRE7BL0MC20111222 (discussing the 
thousands of forged mortgage documents from across the country); Nizan Geslevich Packin, 
Breaking Bad? Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Not Guilty as Not Charged, 91 WASH U. L. REV. 1089, 
1095 (2014) (“[T]he Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in its final report, ‘uses variants of 
the word “fraud” no fewer than 157 times in describing what led to the crisis[.]’”); Ceresney, 
Eng & Nuttall, supra note 17, at 237 (noting that “[t]he number of suspicious activity reports 
that financial institutions filed relating to mortgage fraud [in 2007]” was six times the number 
filed in 2003.) (quoting figure 1 from the 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report, FBI (Apr. 2008) 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2007/mortgage-fraud-2007). See 
generally BARRY RITHOLTZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY: HOW SYSTEMIC BANK FRAUD 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/38af0f2b-
1768-40cd-bd58-09277d4f8559/04-12-2011-Summit-Ritholtz-Follow_the_Money.aspx. 
 129. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm 
to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 
876 n.37 (2011) (listing several leading economists—including those at Merrill Lynch (now 
part of Bank of America) and Morgan Stanley—who foresaw the financial crisis years in 
advance). 
 130. Jennifer Taub, Mythbusters: Telling the Truth About the Financial Crisis, Part III, 
PARETO COMMONS (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.theparetocommons.com/2011/02/ mythbusters-
telling-the-truth-about-the-financial-crisis-part-iii/ (“Financial sector insiders, consumer 
advocates, regulators, economists and other experts saw the warning signs. They spoke out 
frequently concerning the housing bubble and the predatory and lax mortgage underwriting 
practices that fueled it.”). 
 131. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before 
the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 111th Cong. 132 (Apr. 27, 2010) 
(questioning Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, about the mortgage instruments sold by 
Goldman Sachs sold to unwitting customers); see also Grossman, Glazer & Rexrode, supra 
note 15 (noting emails from bankers and traders at Bank of America and J.P. Morgan that stated 
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recent case developing against Morgan Stanley, there is indisputable 
evidence that the bank was not just a passive consumer, but a 
sophisticated partner actively shaping these securities.
132
 Of course, 
none of this evidence establishes that a high-level executive had the 
knowledge or intent to defraud. This reality is in part because as the 
warning call went up the chain, those in the know chose to ignore the 
sirens or dismissed those who had raised the cry.
133
  
Second, if the first retort is correct (that there was indeed criminal 
misconduct), then the public impulse to punish financial executives is 
not misplaced. By focusing disproportionately on populist emotion, 
the critics conflate a simpleton’s anger with the proper moral outrage 
that fuels any form of criminal condemnation. And by using the term 
“mob justice,” critics imply retribution bloated on cathartic anger, but 
empty of logical, moral, or policy grounds. What the critics miss is 
that a proper weighing of whether moral condemnation is justified 
takes more into consideration than emotion alone; it takes into 
account whether corresponding and independent reasons for 
proportional punishment exist. By painting popular support of 
punishment as uncontrolled, pitchforks-in-hand, populist justice, 
critics obscure the underlying logic and facts described in the 
previous paragraph.
134
 
 
“These are the worst mortgages I’ve ever seen,” and “[l]ike a fat kid in dodgeball, these [low 
quality loans] need to stay on the sidelines”). 
 132. Nathaniel Popper, Court Filing Illuminates Morgan Role in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2014, at B1 (“[Morgan Stanley] actively influenced New Century’s push into riskier 
and more onerous mortgages, and brushed aside questions about the ability of homeowners to 
make the payments.”). 
 133. Id. (describing an incident where Morgan Stanley terminated a due diligence officer 
when the officer notified the company of fraud). 
 134. Much of the narrative on populist anger in the context of the 2008 Financial Crisis has 
been driven by the media, by Occupy Wall Street, and the protests against AIG bonuses. See, 
e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Angry About Financial Crisis, GALLUP (Oct. 2, 
2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/110914/Majority-Americans-Angry-About-FinancialCrisis. 
aspx; Phil Mintz, Off With Their Heads: Samples of AIG Outrage, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS 
(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2009/ db2009 
0317_032819.htm; Ivan J. Dominguez, Calling for a Cooling-Off Period: Avoiding a Rush to 
Judgment in the Midst of the Market Meltdown, 32 CHAMPION 57 (2008) (“‘Off with their 
heads!’ scream the hordes of angry taxpayers, pitchforks and torches in hand as they march on 
the banking system and the government demanding human names and faces with criminally 
culpable minds and hands. Oh, and never mind so much about culpability, it is the punishing 
part that is most important.”). 
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Third, the criticism that the standard of recklessness still makes 
prosecution difficult misunderstands the balance achieved by the 
recklessness standard. The idea behind lowering the intent 
requirement is not to make any and all kinds of criminal prosecution 
related to financial misconduct “easy.” Instead, the idea is to take a 
standard (i.e., specific intent) that made it practically impossible to 
prosecute, and adjust that standard to make prosecutions more viable 
for an extreme situation where prosecution should have occurred (i.e., 
a financial crisis that ranks as one of the two most devastating in US 
history). Moreover, such difficulty in prosecution is not without 
purpose because where a person’s liberty is at stake, the standard 
should encompass some form of mens rea. To jail someone for 
negligence or under strict liability crosses the line into mob justice. 
Fourth, the problem of overcriminalization cannot be pinned on 
this single proposed law that lowers intent for just one crime. Rather, 
it is symptomatic of the accumulation of overlapping, poorly aimed, 
reactive laws.
135
 If this law can be narrowly tailored with a clear a 
mens rea, if it aims to fix a gap that the current criminal system 
cannot fill, and if it is crafted with adequate consideration towards the 
purposes of condemnation, punishment, and deterrence, it can be an 
appropriate law.
136
 In other words, if written with limits similar to 
 
 135. See generally Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing 
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (“Duplicative statutes, federalization of 
conduct traditionally belonging to the States, criminalization of regular business activity or 
social conduct and interactions, this is overcriminalization. When any of these elements is 
combined with poor legislative drafting, inadequate mens rea requirements, or unfettered 
prosecutorial discretion, the result is inevitably the victimization of more law-abiding citizens.”) 
(emphasis added); Ellen S. Podgor, Introduction Overcriminalization: New Approaches to A 
Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 530 (2012) (“The continuous 
multiplication of laws creates problems. You end up adding more laws to the existing ones, 
without discarding any in the process. This dynamic is the problem of overcriminalization and 
overfederalization.”). 
 136. See Kerem, supra note 6, at 113. (“Even those . . . who insist that criminal law ought 
to be reserved for conduct that society finds so repugnant as to warrant the severest sanctions 
will be hard-pressed to deny that the corporate misconduct which produced the societal 
suffering endured since the 2008 Financial Crisis’ onset qualifies as sufficiently repugnant.”) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  
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those in the British law,
137
 there is no reason to believe that it will 
punish those who are not truly responsible.
138
  
As to the fifth point, the SEC has not used the clawback and 
industry bar provisions against major executives, so it is unclear 
whether those provisions can fulfill the roles of punishment, 
deterrence, and condemnation. To be fully effective, however, these 
punishments will likely need to be carried out under the imprimatur 
of a criminal prosecution that fully attaches the stigma of society’s 
disapprobation. In addition, nothing prevents lawmakers from writing 
a law that uses clawbacks and industry bars in conjunction with 
incarceration. 
Finally, there is an assumption not voiced in the critics’ analysis. 
Without any changes to the current legal system,
139
 we are forced to 
accept that American taxpayers will continue to bear the social and 
economic costs of corporate risk-taking while corporate executives 
retain both their riches and a de facto zone of immunity from 
prosecution.
140
 This business-as-usual arrangement is not one the 
American people can accept. 
CONCLUSION 
The quote which starts this Note can be read as an indictment of 
the morals of Wall Street, a scapegoating of bankers while masking 
the failure of regulators, law makers, and others involved in the 
financial crisis. It is not intended as such. Bankers have not grown 
more immoral than their predecessors, nor have the number of 
immoral bankers overrun the number of moral ones. Instead, the 
 
 137. Peter J. Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 77–79 
(2014) (noting three important limits to the UK legislation: a seven year limit on imprisonment, 
subjective awareness of the risk of a decision by a corporate executive, and massive failure of a 
financial institution that would require government takeover). 
 138. Id. at 86–87 (suggesting a monetary threshold of $1 billion to further limit the 
application of the law to only the worst of the worst financial crimes). 
 139. That does not necessarily mean that the change of adding a financial misconduct law 
is the right answer. As Judge Rakoff has astutely suggested, it might mean mustering the 
political will to simply enforcing the laws that already exist. Rakoff, supra note 8. 
 140. See generally Barry Ritholtz, The Biggest Lie of the Century, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Sept. 10, 2012, 10:19 AM EDT), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-10/the-
biggest-lie-of-the-new-century (“One can’t help think that [Bank of America’s $16.65 billion 
settlement] bought immunity from prosecution for executives.”). 
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quote highlights the reality of modern American capitalism and the 
humans who function within it. Bankers are competitive.
141
 They are 
in the business of making money. That they take every advantage 
they can, as far as—and all too often farther than—the letter of the 
law allows, is to be expected. 
But given that fact, government regulation is the proper 
counterbalance to that force.
142
 While not perfect, it is the 
government’s role as enforcer that tempers the excesses of Wall 
Street and creates a level playing field for bankers who play by the 
rules. Most of all, it takes into account the collateral damage of 
banks’ risk-taking by protecting citizens who—neither party to the 
trades that took place nor desirous of its results—lost jobs, life 
savings, and homes. 
To properly serve the people, it will take more than tagging 
financial institutions with civil fines.
143
 Instead, a financial 
misconduct law that employs recklessness as the appropriate mens 
rea is an important part of the regulatory ecosystem.
144
 Such a law is 
not, however, a panacea to this financial crisis or a prophylactic for 
the next. It is just another weapon in the prosecutorial arsenal. In the 
end, the financial misconduct law will only be effective if those 
charged with watching the inmates have the political will to wield it. 
 
 141. John Cassidy, Why Do Banks Go Rogue: Bad Culture or Lax Regulation?, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/why-do-banks-go-
rogue-bad-culture-or-lax-regulation (“[I]nvestment bankers will inevitably be driven to cut 
corners, take outlandish risks, and generally engage in behavior that, although privately 
rational, is socially pernicious.”). 
 142. Id. (“The only way to control investment banks, and to direct their activities in a more 
socially useful direction, is to sit on them hard—with strict limits on leverage, intrusive 
regulation, and harsh punishments for self-dealing behavior.”). 
 143. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal As Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1789, 1839–49 (2015) (disagreeing with the need for expanded criminal prosecution but 
suggesting other ways to improve criminal prosecution). 
 144. “Regulatory ecosystem” refers to the legislators who create the legislative rules, the 
regulators who enforce the rules, the financial institutions that live under the rules, and the 
public, which trusts that these rules are fair. 
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